In recent years, several high profile firms engaged in accounting fraud that resulted in severe investor losses and erosion of trust in the capital markets. We examine high profile accounting "scandals" prosecuted by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Unlike most prior literature, we focus on the negative consequences that these "scandal firms" caused on competing firms. We find preliminary evidence that the compensation earned by executives in competing firms decreased as scandal firms appeared to perform better via inflated results. We also find that competing firms managed earnings more when their performance was lagging behind the performance of the "scandal firm".
Introduction
A number of highly publicized accounting scandals have disconcerted investors in recent years as prominent firms disclosed major accounting violations and investors in seemingly successful firms lost billions of dollars. In this study, we document the economic consequences of aggressive financial reporting on the industry peers of "scandal firms" such as Enron and Worldcom (perceived leaders in their respective industries that were later found to have violated However, the negative impact of accounting fraud may not be limited to the scandal firm and its stakeholders. Reducing investor confidence in the reliability of financial information jeopardizes the efficient allocation of resources within the whole economy. There is some empirical evidence of negative abnormal returns for competing firms when a peer announces a restatement (Gleason et al. 2004 .) Gleason et al. (2004) suggest this result may be due to an increased likelihood of financial reporting irregularities in the competing firms. Also, Gonen (2003) shows that the contagion effect is larger whenever the fraudulent firm is dominant in its industry or the industry is highly concentrated. His empirical finding suggests that if the scandal firm provides a performance benchmark for its industry, then the likelihood that that its competitors committed fraud is also higher.
Explicit or implicit benchmarking of executive performance at peer firms relative to executives of scandal firms may provide a transmission mechanism for the fraudulent reporting to negatively affect other firms. If prior to the discovery of fraud, competitors' boards usedirectly or indirectly -the performance of scandal firms as a benchmark in their executives' evaluations, the inflated performance of scandal firms is likely to result in less favorable performance evaluations for managers of competing firms. Charles Noski, AT&T's vice chairman prior to the MCI scandal, describes this situation: "We were constantly dissecting all of the public information about WorldCom/MCI and we would scratch our heads and try to figure out how they were doing it all.
‡ " At the time, AT&T was viewed as the legacy provider of telephone services. The general view on Wall Street was that their systems were antiquated. At the 2005 AAA meetings, Noski described strategy discussions with AT&T's COO offering $2-$4 billion for upgrading of systems. They concluded that AT&T had the best ‡ WorldCom/MCI Rivals Vexed by Phantom Competitors, Tulsa World, July 7, 2002 telecommunications systems and did not require the additional investment §
The senior executives at AT&T were perplexed that their firm's performance kept lagging behind the performance of Worldcom.
Benchmarking is widely recommended by consultants and others to provide desirable incentives for managers. Benchmarking appears, at least on the surface, to be a reasonably objective approach to evaluate any set of employees, including senior managers. ** First, a set of firms and performance measures are selected. † † Over time, the Board of Directors evaluates senior management relative to the performance of the comparison firms. When managers outperform their benchmarks, they are rewarded appropriately. The general notion is that superior performance relative to a standard is rewarded. Implicit in any benchmarking exercise is an assumption that all performance measures are reported accurately, or at a minimum with similar incentives, biases, and approaches. Our research seeks to understand the consequences of significant departures from this latter assumption.
A benchmarking exercise becomes problematic when a benchmark firm reports in a deviant fashion. Let us assume that the deviant reporting firm has positively biased reported earnings.
Under these conditions, the standard for managers' performance is upward biased by the impact of the fraudulent report. A peer firm's manager whose performance is evaluated relative to the deviant firm is faced with a difficult problem. ‡ ‡ She must choose to either (1) Murphy (1999) provides evidence that firms utilize benchmarking across different industries. † † Regulation FK requires firms to disclose their performance (measured in terms of annual stock returns) relative to the cumulative total return of a broad equity market index and of an industry index or peer group. ‡ ‡ A Three-Card Monte Dealer named Canada Bill faced a similar problem on the Mississippi as our senior manager. As Bill was losing his entire bankroll at Faro, a friend approached and said, "Bill, don't you know this game is crooked?" Bill became famous for responding, "but it's the only game in town."
she decides not to change reporting conventions, her performance will be conditionally lower relative to the benchmark resulting in less reward for her performance (lower compensation). In extreme circumstances, she may face termination. Alternatively, she may adopt a more aggressive reporting strategy to partially match the bias in the standard created by the fraudulently reporting firm. In either case, the benchmarking exercise may result in unintended consequences.
We show that there were costs that scandal firms imposed on their competitors' managements. In particular, we hypothesize and find evidence suggesting that:
• the CEOs and top-five executives of competitor firms receive lower compensation as a consequence of comparing their own performance with the inflated performance of scandal firms within their industry;
• firms engage in more earnings management the further their performance lags behind the performance of the scandal firm(s) in their industry.
Our paper contributes to the literature exploring the contagion effects that scandal firms impose on their competitors and provides new insights (1) to regulators, since they should weigh all economic consequences of accounting fraud as they develop rules and impose penalties on fraudulent behavior, (2) to boards of directors and compensation committees, suggesting caution as they select firms they want to benchmark against, to evaluate their managers' performance, and (3) to managers who should guard against trying to match rather than question competitors' unreasonable or unrealistic results.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we develop our hypothesis, in Section 3 we describe the sample and methodology utilized, and in Section 4 we present our results. Section 5 concludes. We examine the use of peer performance in incentive contracts from a different perspective, by examining the effect that a fraudulently reporting competitor has on performance expectations. Benchmarking on the performance of high-profile firms in an industry provides incentives to improve management practices. Murphy (1999) provides survey evidence that compensation contracts reflect the use of targets based on the performance of above-median performers within an industry.
Hypothesis Development
Given their inflated performance and resulting high visibility, scandal firms are likely to be used as benchmarks by their competitors. As described in a BusinessWeek article: § § Weak results on RPE have prompted scholars to explore different motives to use (or not to use) RPE. For example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) claim that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of RPE. They argue that rewarding CEOs for rivals' performance can be used to soften product market competition. Oyer (2004) and Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2005) If a firm is unable to recognize that the scandal firm's performance is driven by accounting irregularities, it will likely benchmark against it, leading to the following prediction:
H1: CEOs' (Top executives') compensation will be positively related to their firms' performance and negatively related to the performance of scandal firms within the industry after controlling for the performance of non-scandal peer firms.
A natural follow-up question is related to the executive's response to being evaluated relative to the performance of a scandal firm. Using scandal firm's performance as a benchmark could be misleading, since such performance may not be replicated through legitimate means. We analyze the effect of the scandal firms' performance on executive compensation and earnings management in peer firms, during the time period of the alleged fraud (specified in the Accounting and Auditing Earnings Releases, and described in column 5, Table 1 ). To conduct this analysis, we define scandal firms in two alternative ways:
(1) all scandal firms identified in the two-digit SIC industry † † † To identify such firms, we searched for the word "fraud" in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (as in Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 2006). (2) the first scandal firm to commit fraud in the industry (see column 4, Table 1 ) -we chose to analyze the first scandal firm, since peer firms will most likely decrease their reliance on competitors' performance numbers after learning about the initial scandals.
Methodology and Variable Definition

Managerial Compensation at Competing Firms
To test our first hypothesis, we investigate to what extent the scandal firms' performance affects the compensation of executives in "peer" firms ("i"). We test this hypothesis using the following OLS regression, clustered by firm:
The regression includes one or more observations per each firm "i", corresponding to the fiscal years during which the "scandal firm(s)" in firm i's industry committed fraud. We use two alternative measures of compensation as dependent variables: the CEO's and the top-5 executives' total compensation (CEOCOMP and EXECCOMP, respectively). Our total compensation measures comprise salary, bonus, value of restricted stock granted, Black-Scholes value of stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other forms of annual compensation reported in Execucomp (e.g. severance payments, contributions to benefit plans).
Given the fact that the compensation measures are highly skewed (see Table 2 ), we use the natural logarithm of total compensation in our regressions.
We measure each peer firm's performance using annual stock returns (RET), and evaluate the extent to which the (average) performance of the scandal firm(s) (RETScandal) in the same industry, affects the executives' compensation over and above the firm's own performance. Our first hypothesis predicts a negative sign for the coefficient associated to RETScandal.
To ensure that the effect of RETScandal is not just capturing economic reasons related to common "industry conditions," we control for the median performance of the industry peers (RETPeers), as well as for market wide returns (S&P500RET), measured as the S&P 500 annual returns. Agency theory (e.g. Holmstrom 1982 ) predicts peer performance may be utilized to remove any information related to common uncertainties faced by the industry (or the market) as a whole from firm i's performance. Thus, we would expect a negative incremental effect of RETPeers and S&P500RET on the executives' compensation. However, Oyer (2004) and Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2005) suggest the market and industry negative effects on compensation may be offset if such performance measures are associated with higher outside employment opportunities.
We also control for other potential correlated omitted variables in the compensation regressions. We include controls for the firm's size, competition, and growth opportunities; the level of noise in the RET performance measure; governance characteristics of the firm, and year dummies:
Firm's size, competition, and growth opportunities:
• LNSIZE -We measure size as the natural logarithm of total assets. We include this variable into the compensation regression, following prior research showing that larger firms provide higher compensation to their CEOs, presumably since larger firms require more skilled managers and are associated with higher costs of monitoring (Rosen 1982 , Eaton and Rosen 1983 , Smith and Watts, 1992 ).
• NUMBERPeers -We count the number of firms in the same industry. Previous research shows that the degree of competition affects the extent to which firms use RPE (Aggarawal and Samwick 1999). We also predict that the number of firms in an industry positively relates to the outside employment opportunities for an executive, thus we predict a positive coefficient for this variable.
• GROWTH-We use the firm's market-to-book ratio as a measure of investment opportunities.
Agency theory suggests that greater investment opportunities are associated with greater incentive pay (Smith and Watts 1992 , Gaver and Gaver 1993 and Indjejikian and Nanda 2002 .
Corporate governance controls:
The level of compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to the annual returns performance measures, may also be affected by the governance structure of the firm (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999, Bushman and Smith 2001) . Lesser use of RPE may be explained by management entrenchment. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that pay is more closely associated with luck (observable positive shocks) especially in firms with poor governance. Thus we control for the following variables:
• CEO/EXECHOLDINGS-. We measure CEOHOLDINGS (EXECHOLDINGS) for our CEO (top 5 executives) compensation regression, as CEO's (top 5 executives') holdings of stock and stock options scaled by total shares outstanding. The relation of this variable to compensation is uncertain. On one hand, CEO and executives' holdings may serve as an alternative means to align CEO's and top executives' interests with those of the shareholders, resulting in lower compensation (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999) . On the other hand, this measure may capture a higher level of entrenchment, in which case they would relate to higher compensation (e.g. Albuquerque 2005 ).
• BOARDINDEPENDENCE-We also expect board independence to be negatively related to the executives' compensation. We measure "lack" of independence using three variables indicating the percentage of top-5 executives sitting on the board of directors (EXECBOARD), whether the CEO is the chairman of the board (CEOCHAIR), and whether the firm discloses a conflict of interest in the compensation committee (INTERLOCK).
Control variables affecting the pay-performance sensitivity:
• STDRET -The standard deviation of RET measures how noisy the returns number is.
According to Lambert and Larcker (1987) the executive's compensation will be less sensitive returns, the higher the standard deviation of RET. Prendergast (2002) also finds that firms with greater uncertainty are more likely to provide incentives, since they need to rely more heavily on delegation. Thus, we expect STDRET will be associated with higher levels of compensation.
Earnings Management at Competing Firms
Our second hypothesis investigates the association between discretionary accruals and the gap between a company's non-discretionary earnings and the (average) earnings of a competing scandal firm(s), both scaled by lagged assets (EARNINGSGAP). We test for this relationship by running the following OLS regression, clustered by firm:
We follow four steps to calculate DISCACC and EARNINGSGAP using a modified crosssectional Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995):
Step 1 : We estimate total accruals as:
where:
∆WC=change in working capital (change in current assets minus change in current liabilities) DEP=depreciation ∆TP=Change in taxes payable
A=total assets
Step 2: Using the result in step 1, we estimate the following model for each two-digit SIC code each year:
∆REV=change in revenues;
∆REC=change in accounts receivable PPE=property, plant and equipment;
Step 3: We calculate non-discretionary accruals (NDA) for each firm, each year, using the coefficients α 1 , α 2 , α 3 estimated from the model in Step 2.
Step 4: Finally, we calculate discretionary accruals (DISCACC) and the gap between the scandal firm's performance and the firm's non discretionary accruals as follows:
We control for the competing firms' performance using the peers' median returns (RETPeers), and other control variables that explain the cross-section of discretionary accruals.
Our control variables address three different drivers of discretionary accruals that relate to: (i) managerial incentives that lead to biased discretionary accruals, (ii) corporate governance attributes that counter-balance opportunistic managerial discretion, and (iii) operating environment attributes related to firm characteristics and prevailing market conditions.
Controls related to managerial incentives:
These controls include variables related to compensation incentives and debt covenants: (6) The incentive ratio captures the share of a hypothetical top-5 executives' total compensation, that would result from a one-percent change in the stock price:
• Debt Covenant Variables: Positive accounting theory suggests that firms approaching covenant violations or facing higher litigation risk will use higher income-increasing accruals (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994) . We control for debt covenant concerns using two variables:
i. LEVERAGE, is calculated as total debt divided by total assets ii. LITIGATION, is a dummy defined as in Matsumoto (2002) . It is equal to 1 if the firm is in a high-risk industry and 0 otherwise (SICs 2833 (SICs -2836 **** § § § The ONEPCT measure assumes a dollar increase in the share price translates to a dollar increase in the value of a stock option. This assumption is reasonable only for options that are deep in the money. A more accurate measure would adjust the sensitivity of options to a one percent change in price based on the Black-Sholes formula (as in Core and Guay 1999) . Bergstresser and Philipon (2006) show that both measures, adjusted and un-adjusted, are equally effective in capturing the association between equity incentives and discretionary accruals, thus we utilize the un-adjusted ONEPCT measure. **** Although Matsumoto (2002) predicts a positive relation between litigation and earnings management, based on positive accounting theory, her empirical analysis concludes the opposite, an indication that litigation risk is likely to discipline opportunistic management of earnings.
Controls related to corporate governance:
The corporate governance variables that we use control for the attributes of a board that would limit opportunistic behavior by management. Specifically, we control for BOARDINDEPENDENCE, CEOCHAIR, and INTERLOCK defined as in the previous section.
Controls related to the operating environment:
We take into account different characteristics of the firms' operating environment that may affect the use of discretionary accruals. Prior research suggests that the firm's size (SIZE) and the volatility of the environment (STDRET) increase the use of accruals (Frankel, Johnson and Nelson 2002) , as managers in such firms try to present consistent performance over time.
However Matsumoto (2002) predicts and finds a negative association between the volatility of the environment and the use of accounting accruals, suggesting that the market is likely to get less surprised in such environments, resulting in less pressure to manipulate accounting numbers.
We measure SIZE as total assets and STDRET as the standard deviation of annual stock price returns over the last five years. We also control for expected profitability and growth opportunities using the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the year (GROWTH). Prior literature suggests stock prices are more sensitive to earnings in firms with higher growth opportunities. Therefore, such firms have higher incentives to manage earnings (Collins and Kothari 1989, Matsumoto 2002 ). Finally, we control for market (S&P500RET) and industry (RETPeers) performances to account for changes in economic conditions (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2005) . Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables utilized in our analysis. The median CEO (top-5 executive) in our sample receives $2.2 million ($1.3 million) in total annual compensation, though there is significant variation across firms. Since CEOs' and top-5 executives' compensation measures are highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of compensation as the dependent variable in our regression analysis.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The majority of firms are successful in the year before accounting irregularities in their industries are publicly disclosed, with mean (median) annual returns of 23.8% (6.6%). The average firm's monthly stock return standard deviation is 0.66. Scandal firms perform better than their peers, in terms of annual stock returns but not in terms of ROA. We identified about 74 firms in each of the industries with a "scandal firm" (Table 1 specifies the number of firms identified in each industry). The mean firm in our sample has $6.8bn in assets, and market value of equity six times the size of its book value. With respect to governance characteristics, we find that less than 3% of the firms disclose a conflict of interest in their compensation committee, in 61% of the firms the CEO is also the chair of the board of directors, and the percentage of top-5 executives sitting in the board of directors is on average 36%. Table 3 reports Pearson correlations among the variables used in our regressions. Results show that the CEO's compensation measures are positively related to the firm's own stock return performance, albeit the p-value is only 0.16. The correlations support our hypothesis that the stock returns of scandal firms are negatively related to compensation, suggesting that scandal firm performance is filtered out of the executives' compensation. To the extent that the performance of scandal firms is capturing some information related to the overall industry performance, this result is inconclusive, thus we control for potential correlated omitted variables in our multivariate analysis. Consistent with prior studies, size, is positively related to compensation. CEO and executives' holdings of stock and stock options are negatively related to compensation, suggesting they constitute alternative means of compensating and motivating CEOs and other executives'. The positive relation between compensation and CEOCHAIR and EXECBOARD suggests that lack of board independence leads to higher CEO and executives' pay, however, contrary to expectations, our INTERLOCK measure is negatively related to compensation. It is possible that this latter measure is influenced by a few exceptional cases, given that less than 3% of our sample firms describe a conflict of interest in the compensation committee. Table 4 , Panel A provides some support to the prediction in hypothesis 1 that firms benchmark against scandal firms. Results suggest that CEOs are compensated based on their own firm's stock returns, and relative to the scandal firm's returns. In the three models presented, the coefficient on RET is significantly positive, while the coefficient on the scandal firm's stock returns (RETScandal) is negative, although not always significant. In Model 1 we define scandal firms as all the scandal firms in an industry (a total of 27 firms, listed in Table 1 ), while Models 2 and 3 define scandal firms only as the first scandal occurring in each industry (15 firms, identified in column four of Table 1 ). The relation between the scandal firms' performance (RETScandal) and CEO compensation in Model 1 is negative but insignificant. A potential explanation for this weak result is that once the first accounting fraud in the industry is revealed, firms become more cautious about benchmarking against their peers. To increase the power of the test, we re-define scandal firms as only the first scandal firms in each industry. Model 2 shows that the performance of the first scandal firm in the industry (RETScandal) is indeed negatively related to the compensation of CEOs in competing firms. Furthermore, Model 3
Multivariate Analysis
Managerial Compensation at Competing Firms
shows that this association becomes even stronger if the scandal firm is a top performer in its industry: we find a significantly negative effect on CEO compensation when we interact RETScandal with a dummy indicating whether the scandal firm's performance was above median in its industry.
Similar to Gibbons and Murphy (1990) , we find evidence of RPE with respect to market returns (S&P500RET) but not to industry returns (RETPeers). The lack of RPE with respect to the industry median may be explained by the positive relation between RETPeers and outside employment opportunities in the industry, which increase the reservation wage that must be paid to the CEO (Oyer 2004 , Rajgopal et al. 2005 As expected from prior literature (e.g. Watts 1992, Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999) , size and growth are positively associated to higher pay, although growth is positively significant only in Model 2 and insignificant in all other specifications. STDRET is also positively related to CEO compensation, consistent with the idea that this measure captures the level of uncertainty and complexity of the business (Prendergast 2002) , and the number of competitors in an industry is positively associated to CEO pay, perhaps an indication that more firms within an industry increase the outside employment opportunities for the CEO. Results on the governance variables are mixed. Although we find that compensation is higher in firms where the CEO is also the chairman of the board (in line with our predictions), we also find that compensation is lower in firms disclosing a conflict of interest in their compensation committee. Results related to the control variables in Table 4 , Panel B are almost the same as those in Table 4 , Panel A, with two exceptions: first, Model 4 suggest the use of RPE not only based on the median returns in the market (S&P500RET) but also on the industry median (RETPeers), and second, the board's lack of independence, as measured by the percentage of top-5 executives sitting on the board of directors (EXECBOARD), is significantly positively related to the level of pay of these five executives.
Earnings Management at Competing Firms
A possible implication of firms benchmarking against the performance of scandal firms (especially the performance of the leading scandal firm in the industry), is that executives may have higher pressure to manage earnings, the larger the gap between their own firm's performance and the scandal firm's performance (as predicted in Hypothesis 2) Table 5 , Model 1 provides evidence that the gap between a company's non-discretionary earnings and the average scandal firms' earnings in its industry (EARNINGSGAP), is associated to the use of higher discretionary accruals, after controlling both for industry and market-wide performance. Models 2 and 3 also indicate a significantly positive association between EARNINGSGAP and DISCACC when the analysis focuses exclusively on the first scandal that occurred in the industry. However, Model 3 does not provide evidence of a stronger association between EARNINGSGAP and accruals if the scandal firm was an above median performer.
With respect to the control variables, as expected, size, growth and compensation incentives in the form of bonuses are positively related to the use of accruals (Healy 1985 , Matsumoto 2002 ). In line with Matsumoto's findings, the litigation and volatility variables are negatively related to discretionary accruals. These two results suggest that (a) the risk of litigation is likely to discipline the managers' use of discretionary accruals, and (b) executives may be under less pressure to manage earnings in uncertain environments, where expectations are difficult to form.
Results also provide some evidence that the lack of board independence is associated to the use of higher discretionary accruals (the percentage of executives on the board (EXECBOARD) is associated to higher discretionary accruals in Model 1, while the percentage of executives with conflicts of interest in the compensation committee (INTERLOCK) is positively associated to discretionary accruals in Models 2 and 3).
Conclusions
The unraveling of high profile accounting scandals over the last decade had several economic implications that affected not only the firms charged for using "fraudulent accounting numbers" but also their competitors. Previous literature has documented that competing firms suffer negative abnormal returns whenever a peer company announces a restatement (Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson 2004, Gonen 2003) .
In this paper, we extend this literature by exploring consequences on competing firms. We provide preliminary evidence that, at the time the first accounting frauds occurred, scandal firms' behavior affected executive evaluations in competing firms. Results suggest the scandal firms' "inflated performance" led investors and board members of competing firms to believe their own firm could perform better, resulting in higher expectations and a lower evaluation of their executives. We show that the first scandal firm's performance was associated with a decrease in CEO's and top-five executives' total compensation in competing firms, especially if the scandal firm was an above median performer, in addition to being in any of the S&P 500, S&P 400
Midcap or S&P 600 Smallcap indices. We also provide evidence consistent with the notion that the use of scandal firms' as benchmarks led executives to manage earnings by using higher discretionary accruals.
Besides contributing to the accounting literature exploring the economic consequences of accounting fraud, this paper suggests boards of directors and compensation committees should be cautious as they benchmark their managers' performance against performance in competing firms. The study also informs discussions related to the costs and benefits of imposing rules and penalties to prevent accounting fraud. Our study provides evidence of a cost that accounting fraud imposes on competitor firms. 
Notes:
CEOCOMP=Total CEO compensation in (thousands $); EXECCOMP=Total top-5 executives' compensation in thousands of dollars; DISCACC=Discretionary accruals are defined based on a Modified Jones model; RET, RETScandal=Annual stock returns for the firm analyzed and average stock returns for the scandal firm(s) in its industry, respectively; RETPeers = Median RET for the same two-digit SIC industry firms, excluding the scandal firm; S&P500RET=Annual S&P index returns; EARNINGSGAP=The difference between the scandal firm earnings and the firm's earnings before discretionary accruals; GROWTH=Market-to-book value of equity; CEO/EXECHOLDINGS =CEO (top 5 executive's) stock and stock options holdings scaled by total shares; CEOCHAIR=Dummy equal to 1 for firms where the CEO is the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise; EXECBOARD=Percentage of top-5 executives sitting on the board of directors; INTERLOCK=Dummy equal to 1 if the firm disclosed a conflict of interest in the Compensation Committee in the proxy statement, 0 otherwise; STDRET = Standard deviation of annual returns over the last 5 years. BONUSPCT= top-five executives bonus divided by their total compensation; INCENTIVE_RATIO=Estimate of the share of the top-5 executives' equity incentives to total compensation that would result from a one-percent change in the stock price (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006) ; LEVERAGE= total debt divided by total assets; LITIGATION=Dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in an industry with high-litigation risk; SIZE = Total assets of the firm (million $). 
LNCEOCOMP= Natural logarithm of total CEO compensation in (thousands $); LNEXECCOMP = Natural logarithm of total top-5 executives' compensation in thousands of dollars; DISCACC= ; RET, RETScandal = Annual stock returns for the firm analyzed and average stock returns for the scandal firm(s) in its industry, respectively; Top50=Dummy variable indicating the scandal firm performed above median; RETPeers = Median RET for the same two-digit SIC industry firms, excluding the scandal firm; S&P500RET=Annual S&P index returns; LNSIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets of the firm (million $); GROWTH = Market-to-book value of equity; NUMBERPeers = Number of firms in the same industry-size quartile; CEO/EXECHOLDINGS = CEO (top 5 executive's) stock and stock options holdings scaled by total shares; CEOCHAIR = Dummy equal to 1 for firms where the CEO is the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise; EXECBOARD = Percentage of top-5 executives sitting on the board of directors; INTERLOCK = Dummy equal to 1 if the firm disclosed a conflict of interest in the Compensation Committee in the proxy statement, 0 otherwise; STDRET = Standard deviation of returns over the past five years. Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% DISCACC= Discretionary accruals are defined based on a Modified Jones model; EARNINGSGAP= The difference between the scandal firm earnings and the firm's earnings before discretionary accruals; RETPeers = Median RET for the same two-digit SIC industry firms, excluding the scandal firm; Top50=Dummy variable indicating the scandal firm performed above median; S&P500RET=Annual S&P index returns; BONUSPCT= top-five executives bonus divided by their total compensation; INCENTIVE_RATIO=Estimate of the share of the top-5 executives' equity incentives to total compensation that would result from a one-percent change in the stock price (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006) ; LEVERAGE= total debt divided by total assets; LITIGATION=Dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in an industry with high-litigation risk; CEOCHAIR = Dummy equal to 1 for firms where the CEO is the chairman of the board; EXECBOARD = Percentage of top-5 executives sitting on the board of directors; INTERLOCK = Dummy equal to 1 if the firm disclosed a conflict of interest in the Compensation Committee in the proxy statement, 0 otherwise; SIZE = total assets of the firm (million $); STDRET = Standard deviation of returns over the past five years GROWTH = Market-to-book value of equity.
